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peal," and the holding in this respect was affirmed by the
supreme court.
However, the plaintiff offered to amend by showing additional facts. Presumably he proposed to allege that his duties
sometimes required that he operate or ride in motor vehicles, and
he sought to bring his situation within the doctrine of cases such
as Collins v. Spielman.12 The court of appeal's refusal to allow
this amendment was regarded as error by the supreme court
and the case was remanded.
V. BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LAW
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

Alvin B. Rubin*
In Sherer v. State' the court held that certificates of indebtedness of the Public Service Commission were not negotiable
instruments. Plaintiff sought to recover on certain lost certificates. The state defended on the basis of potential claims by
third persons who might show up with the certificates. Under
Article 2644 of the Civil Code, payment to the original owner of
a non-negotiable instrument would bar action by any transferee,
and the court ordered payment by the state.
VI. CIVIL PROCEDURE
Henry G. McMahon**
JurisdictionRatione Personae
An important question of venue was decided for the first
time during the past year.' On the theory that all members of
a partnership are liable either jointly or in solido for its debts,
plaintiff sued defendant partnership, which was domiciled in
Jefferson Parish, and all of its alleged partners in Orleans Parish,
the domicile of one alleged partner.2 Two of the individual
defendants excepted to the jurisdiction ratione personae of the
11. Reagor v. First Nat. Life Ins. Co., 28 So.(2d) 527 (La. App. 1947).
12. 200 La. 586, 8 So.(2d) 608 (1942).

* Part-time Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University;
member, Baton Rouge bar.
1. 213 La. 728, 35 So. (2d) 591 (1948).

**Professor of. Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Rheuark v. Terminal Mud & Chemical Co., 213 La. 732, 35 So. (2d)
592 (1948).

2. Under Art. 165 (6), La. Code of Practice of 1870, as last amended by
La. Act 282 of 1940.
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Orleans court. This exception was sustained by both the trial
and the appellate courts, the latter holding that the partnership
and its members could be sued only at the domicile of the former,3
as long as the partnership continued. Plaintiff's procedural theory
was rejected through the application of the principle that the
liability of partners, as long as the partnership continues, is not
a primary one. Such an obligation was held to be a vicarious
one which cannot be enforced against the partners until established contradictorily against them, in a suit brought against
both the partnership and its members.
The Petition
The settled rule that documents annexed to and made a
4
part of a petition control its recitals was again applied.
An omission in the language of the prayer of a petition was
held supplemented by the precise words of a recital in the pleading in another case. 5 Plaintiff's prayer for interest, which did not
specify the date from which this interest should run, was held
sufficient, since one of the allegations of the petition supplied this
date definitely.
The trend of liberality of pleading continued unabated during the last term. Strong and additional support for the rules
that amendment of petitions should be allowed by trial judges
even after evidence has been adduced on the trial and that these
rulings will not be disturbed on appeal is offered by Rials v.
Davis." In another case, 7 the court felt compelled to maintain
the judgment of the court below sustaining an exception of no
cause of action, but remanded the case to permit the plaintiff to
amend, if possible.
Exceptions, Rules and Motions
The failure to join indispensable parties again was recognized to be an objection of such serious nature that it may be
raised on the court's own motion.8 A defect of this character
3. Applying Art. 165 (2), La. Code of Practice of

1870, as last amended

by La. Act 282 of 1940.
4. Stacy v. Midstates Oil Corp., 36 So. (2d) 714 (La. 1948); Ortego v.
Morein, 212 La. 774, 33 So. (2d) 516 (1947).
5. Whitten v. Monkhouse, 213 La. 651, 35 So. (2d) 418 (1948).
6. 212 La. 161, 31 So. (2d) 726 (1947). The recent cases on the subject
of the amendment of the petition are discussed in McMahon, Louisiana
Practice (Supp. 1948) 29, 30.
7. Lemoine v. Lacour, 213 La. 109, 34 So. (2d) 392 (1948).

8. Whitney Nat. Bank of New Orleans v. Little Creek Oil Co., 212 La.
)49, 33 So. (2d) 693 (1947).
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is not one which could be waived through a failure to file timely
the dilatory exception of non-joinder.
One of the most vexing problems in the field of the exceptions is determining when an exception of no cause of action can
be utilized to invoke the parol evidence rule, where the plaintiff
either declares on an oral agreement, or his petition fails to disclose the existence of written evidence required by law.9 In
Lemoine v. Lacour,10 an exception of no cause of action was sustained to a petition seeking specific performance of an oral agreement to sell immovable property, since the allegations did not
bring the case within any of the exceptions" to the rule that
every transfer of immovable property must be in writing. The
case was remanded to the trial court for amendment, if possible.
The solution of the problem here appears to be most satisfactory
and quite workable, and it is hoped that it will be applied in all
similar cases in the future.
Perhaps the most trite of all our procedural rules is that
prohibiting the introduction of evidence on the trial of the
exception of no cause of action. However, in one case,' 2 where
such evidence had been introduced in the court below without
objection by the plaintiff, the court held that it had the effect of
enlarging the pleadings and consequently would be considered
on appeal.
The exception of no cause of action was permitted to dispose
of one of two of the plaintiff's demands in one decision.' 3 There,
the curator of an interdicted wife sought to annul a donation
previously made by the interdict on two grounds: first, as an
interspousal donation; and second, as a donation omnium bonorum. Since the first objection was held to be one which was
strictly personal to the donor and could not be asserted by her
curator, the exception was sustained as to this demand. The
second objection, however, was held to be one which could be
asserted by the curator, so the exception was overruled as to this
demand.
Again all doubts were resolved in favor of the plaintiff in
overruling an exception of no cause of action maintained by the
9. This problem is discussed in the cases cited in 1 McMahon, Louisiana
Practice (Supp. 1948) 69.
10. 213 La. 109, 34 So. (2d) 392 (1948).
11. Under Art. 2275, La. Civil Code of 1870.
12. Rheuark v. Terminal Mud & Chemical Co., 213 La. 732, 35 So. (2d)
592 (1948).
13. McIntyre v. Winnsboro State Bank & Trust Co., 213 La. 914, 35 So.
(2d) 853 (1948).
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trial court. A petition for double the amount of earnest money
deposited by plaintiff under a contract to purchase realty was
held not subject to this exception on the ground that the stipulated time for performance had passed, as the pleadings and
evidence did not show that time was of the essence under the
contract. 14
In Janney v. Calmes,'5 the same procedural rules were applied to a plea of estoppel as govern exceptions raising factual
issues. Since no evidence was introduced at the trial of the plea
of estoppel in the court below, the plea was disposed of on the
face of the plaintiff's petition, and overruled.
The thing adjudged was pleaded in three of the cases decided
during the last term. In one, 6 a foundation of the plaintiff's
petitory action was a judgment rendered in a prior boundary
action. Since the latter did not constitute any adjudication of
title, the then owner of the property was not a party thereto, and
the boundary judgment recognized the plaintiff as owner only
of a portion of the disputed tract not involved in the petitory
action, the supreme court refused to hold the boundary judgment
conclusive of the issues presented in the petitory action. An
exception of res judicata was sustained in another case, 17 where
the plaintiff sought to recover loss of property rentals against
a railroad company, the City of New Orleans and the Orleans
Levee Board, and to compel defendants to restore a street to its
former condition. A prior suit against the railroad company
alone to recover damages because of the closing of the street
had been decided adversely to plaintiff, and the judgment therein
was pleaded in bar in the second suit by the railroad company.
Since the two demands were the same, the same parties involved
insofar as defendant railroad was concerned, and the causes of
action were identical, this exception was sustained by both
courts.
The closest case decided by the supreme court during the
last term was Picardv. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New
York.'5 The defendant insurer had filed a declaratory judgment
action in the United States district court, seeking to obtain a judg14. Johnson v. Shreveport Properties, 213 La. 485, 35 So. (2d) 25 (1948);
Newton & Stoer v. Shreveport Properties, 213 La. 503, 35 So. (2d) 31 (1948).
15. 212 La. 750, 33 So. (2d) 510 (1947).
16. Forrest v. Hunter, 213 La. 693, 35 So. (2d) 460 (1948).
17. Cogswell v. Board of Levee Com'rs of Orleans I. D., 213 La. 817, 35
So. (2d) 743 (1948).
18. Picard v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 212 La. 234, 31 So. (2d)
783 (1946).
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ment declaring that the insured's previous total and permanent disability had ceased. The insured counterclaimed, praying for judgment for all disability benefits due to date of trial, together with
the statutory penalties and attorney's fees allowed when a health
and accident insurer withholds payments of benefits due without
just and reasonable cause. The United States district court rendered judgment against the insurer, but rejected the insured's
claim for penalties and attorney's fees. Both parties appealed
from this judgment to the United States circuit court of appeals.
During the pendency of the latter appeal, the insured instituted
the present action in the state district court to recover benefits
due since the date of trial, together with statutory penalties and
attorney's fees. From a judgment as prayed for by plaintiff, the
insurer prosecuted this appeal to the supreme court. While the
latter appeal was pending, the federal appellate court rendered
its decision, and by stipulation this opinion was incorporated into
the transcript, and the insurer pleaded the federal court judgment as res judicata of the cause pending on appeal in the state
court, rendering unsuccessful all benefits due since the rendition
of judgment in the United States district court. On the first
hearing, the supreme court affirmed the judgment appealed from,
by a divided court. On rehearing the majority of the court reversed the judgment of the lower court, holding (1) that the
decision of the federal court was res judicata of any question as
to whether the insurer acted without just and reasonable grounds
in refusing to pay the monthly benefits and (2) that the insurer
had reasonable grounds for refusing to pay these benefits. Chief
Justice O'Niell and Associate Justices Fournet and Bond concurred in the decree, the first two accepting the majority's second
reason but disagreeing with the majority's first position. Justice
Fournet handed down a concurring opinion, relying upon State
v. American Sugar Refinery, 19 and taking the position that since
the two demands were for benefits, penalties and attorney's fees
for different periods of time, res judicata was maintained improperly by the majority. Justice Fournet's concurring opinion
accords with the established rules of our jurisprudence and with
20
civilian concepts of res judicata.
The settled principle that no answer need be filed by a de19. 108 La. 603, 32 So. 965 (1902).
20. Art. 2286, La. Civil Code of 1870. The subject is discussed in Comment (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW R EvIW 397, 491, 495.
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fendant in rule to support the introduction of evidence rebutting
21
the position of a plaintiff in rule again was applied.
The Answer and Incidental Demands
The principle that replicatory pleadings are not required in
Louisiana was again applied. An estoppel relied upon by plaintiff as a counter-defense to a point raised in defendant's answer
was held validly presented. Every objection of law and fact to
a defendant's answer could be relied on by plaintiff without spe22
cial plea.
In Williams v. Williams,23 the court announced very broadly
that when the plaintiff sued for a separation on the ground of
cruel treatment, the defendant would not be permitted to reconvene for a judgment of separation on the ground of abandonment. Though the decision in this case is entirely sound, the general language used by the court is unfortunate. A reconventional
demand usually is precluded in these cases, where husband and
wife live in the same parish, because of a lack of connexity between the main and reconventional demands.24 Under unusual
circumstances, where there exists either diversity of residence
between plaintiff and defendant or connexity between these two
demands, 25 such a reconventional demand might lie.
In another case, 26 a firm of attorneys sued by a client for the
payment of money collected under a judgment were precluded
from reconvening for a larger amount alleged to be due defendants for professional services in other cases or from compensating the debt sued on. Both holdings appear correct: the first
because there was no diversity of residence between the parties
and no connexity between the main and reconventional demands;
and the second because the two debts were not equally liquidated.
The Trial
Generally, a plaintiff has the right to discontinue his suit at
any time prior to rendition of judgment, except to the prejudice
of a reconventional demand or any defense urged "in the nature
21. Melton v. Melton, 36 So. (2d) 395 (La. 1948).
22. Galiano v. Galiano, 213 La. 332, 34 So. (2d) 881 (1948).
23. 212 La. 334, 31 So. (2d) 818 (1947).
24. Art. 375, La. Code of Practice of 1870, as amended; Dowie v. Becker,
149 La. 160, 88 So. 777 (1921).
25. As in Landry v. Regira, 188 La. 950, 178 So. 502 (1921).
26. Noel Estate v. Dickson & Denny, 212 La. 313, 31 So. (2d) 810 (1947).
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In Barbara,Incorporated v. Bil-

prior to rendition of judgment the defendant moved to

discontinue his reconventional demand. This motion was refused
by the trial court, which rendered judgment in favor of defendant
on both demands. On defendant's appeal from this judgment,
the general rule stated above was applied by the supreme court
to the reconventional demand. Defendant's right to discontinue
the latter was upheld.
A constitutional provision 29 requires the district courts in
Orleans Parish to hold continuous sessions during nine and 8a°
half months of the year. This provision was invoked in one case
in an effort to invalidate a divorce decree, rendered by the civil
district court during vacation with consent of both parties. It
was properly held that nothing in the constitutional provision
prevented the court below from rendering a valid judgment by
consent during vacation.
Appeals, Appellate Jurisdictionand Procedure
Motions to dismiss three appeals were based on the ground
that only moot questions were presented. In one,31 where a wife
had appealed from a judgment rejecting her demand for a separation from bed and board, the appeal was held moot, since the
husband already had obtained a final judgment of divorce. In
the second case,3 2 an appeal had been taken from a judgment
revoking permits to sell intoxicating liquors. After the dates on
which these permits would have expired, one of the appellees
moved to dismiss the appeal. Since, under the applicable statute,
the appellant could not have obtained any renewals because of
the revocation of the permits, the motion to dismiss was overruled. In the third case,33 plaintiff had appealed from a judgment
rejecting his demand to be reinstated as a teacher and for compensation during the period following his dismissal. In an application for the return of contributions and accrued interest due
him from the the Teacher's Retirement System, plaintiff had
stated that he did not intend to teach again in Louisiana. Based
upon this, defendant school board moved to dismiss the appeal
27. Rives v. Starcke, 195 La. 378, 196 So. 657 (1940), noted in (1940) 3
457.
28. 212 La. 937, 33 So. (2d) 689 (1947).
29. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 43.
30. Freeman v. Mayer, 212 La. 681, 33 So. (2d) 194 (1947).
31. Sampognaro v. Sampognaro, 213 La. 814, 35 So. (2d) 742 (1948).
32. Breaux v. Trahan, 213 La. 512, 35 So. (2d) 130 (1948).
33. State ex rel. Piper v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 212
La. 714, 33 So. (2d) 206 (1947).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
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as presenting only a moot question. As the suit contained a de-.
mand for compensation for the period following his dismissal,
the motion to dismiss was overruled.
Three interesting questions concerning the right of appeal,
or to a suspensive appeal, were settled during the past term.
In Three Way Finance Company v. McDonald, 4 the garnishees'
right to appeal from an order of court requiring them to retain
amounts held by them and due to the defendant were recognized.
Since these amounts were due under negotiable instruments held
by third parties in no way bound by the court order, the garnishees were held to have a right of appeal from the interlocutory
order. In another case,85 a claimant of certain stock certificates'
was held entitled to an appeal from a judgment recognizing
another as the owner of the stock, even though the appellant was
not a party to the suit below. In Cox v. Cox,36 the supreme court
held that the trial court could not render a valid order of suspensive appeal from a judgment awarding custody of the two
children to the wife, even though previously the parties had
agreed that each spouse would be given custody of one of the
children.
Cotton v. Wright 7 applied the well settled rule that a motion
to dismiss an appeal based on the Want of any legal right to
appeal need not be filed within three days of the return day.
The rule itself is quite simple of statement, but its application to
concrete circumstances has always been difficult and troublesome.

8

A number of decisions determined some issue as to the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court. In one, 89 the rule was
applied that palpably inflated claims will not be accepted at face
value for jurisdictional purposes. In Sheffield v. Jefferson Parish
Developers,40 it was held that the amounts in dispute in consoli41
dated suits could not be aggregated for jurisdictional purposes.
34. 213 La. 504, 35 So. (2d) 31 (1948).

35. State ex rel. Zeldon v. Home Realty Inv. Co., 36 So. (2d) 633 (La.
1948).
36. 212 La. 726, 33 So. (2d) 500 (1947).
37. 36 So. (2d) 713 (La. 1948).
38. The more recent cases on the subject are collected and discussed in
1 McMahon, Louisiana Practice (Supp. 1948) 102, 103.
39. Trahan v. Breaux, 212 La. 457, 32 So. (2d) 845 (1947).
40. 213 La. 799, 35 So. (2d) 737 (1948).
41. The conflicting cases on this subject, and the analogous question of
whether plural claims cumulated in a petition can be aggregated for jurisdictional purposes, are collected and discussed in 1 McMahon, Louisiana
Practice (Supp. 1948) 10, 11.
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In another decision,4 2 the court held that legislative permission
to sue the state was a "law" within the intent of the constitutional
provision granting the supreme court exclusive appellate jurisdiction where a state law had been declared unconstitutional.
A fourth case 43 applied the rule that the appellate court would
take cognizance of its own lack of jurisdiction when facts affirmatively establishing such jurisdiction did not appear of record. In
a fifth decision,"4 the issue of jurisdiction was raised by the court
in oral argument, and an affidavit intended to evidence this
jurisdiction was filed subsequently by the appellant. Holding that
even the facts alleged in the affidavit did not establish affirmatively the jurisdiction of the court, the latter refused to consider,
the appeal. All five of these cases were transferred to the courts
of appeal.
The usual number of questions concerning appellate procedure are to be found in the decisions rendered at the last term.
In Cressione v. Millet,45 an appeal only from that portion of the
judgment of divorce awarding custody of a child, was held valid
as a devolutive appeal, even though it was applied for more than
thirty days after rendition of judgment, and no appeal could46
then have been taken from the divorce decree. In another case,
no appeal bond had been filed. As the appellee did not complain
thereof either in brief or oral agrument, the defect was treated
as waived.
In In re Hibernia Bank & Trust Company,47 the appellant
had secured several extensions of the time for filing the transcript of appeal, alleging the inability of the clerk of the court
below to complete the transcript timely. Subsequently,, the appellee moved to dismiss the appeal, assigning as a reason therefor
that the delay in the preparation of the transcript was not attributable to the clerk, but only to appellant's failure to inform
the clerk of the particular documents to be included in the transcript. Finding the latter facts established, the appeal was dismissed.
The settled rule that the judgment appealed from cannot be
42. Fouchaux v. Board of Com'rs of Port of New Orleans, 213 La. 738,

35 So. (2d) 738 (1948).
43. Green v. George, 213 La. 739, 35 So. (2d) 595 (1948).
44. Louisiana Wholesale Distributors Ass'n v. Rosenzweig, 212 La. 1015,
34 So. (2d)

58 (1947).

45. 212 La. 691, 33 So. (2d) 198 (1947).
46. Roach v. Roach, 213 La. 746, 35 So. (2d) 597 (1948).
47. 213 La. 790, 35 So. (2d) 733 (1948). See, to the same effect, In re
Liquidation of Hibernia Bank & Trust Co., 213 La. 797, 35 So. (2d) 736 (1948)

(three cases).
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amended in favor of an appellee who had neither appealed nor
answered the appeal, was again applied.48 A remand was ordered
in another case,49 in a commendable effort to give the parties
an additional opportunity to offer all evidence available, and to
amend their pleadings to obtain relief which could not be granted:
under the pleadings submitted.
The applicable constitutional provision" provides that "the
rules of practice regulating appeals to, and proceedings in, the
supreme court, shall apply to appeals and proceedings in the
courts of appeal, so far as they be applicable, until otherwise
provided." Article 912 of the Code of Practice provides that
applications for rehearing in the supreme court must be submitted in an elaborated petition. Cox v. Shreveport Packing
Company5' settled the authority of the intermediate appellate
courts to adopt by rule procedural requirements different from
those applying to the supreme court. Pointing out that while the
proviso in the language quoted above contained the words "unless
otherwise provided by law" in the Constitution of 1879, the last
two words thereof were omitted from the corresponding provisos.
of later constitutions, it was held that rules adopted by the courts
of appeal might validly prescribe the mode and manner of applying for rehearings therein.
Supervisory Jurisdictionand Procedure
A procedural question of some importance was. decided in
Trimble v. Employers Mutual Casualty Company.5 2 A constitutional provision 53 governs the running of delays for applying for
rehearings in the Courts of Appeal, First and Second Circuits;
and provides that such delays do not begin to run until service
on counsel of the judgment of the intermediate appellate court.
This provision was held inapplicable to the thirty days' delay for
applying to the supreme court for a writ of review to a judgment
of a court of appeal. Even though counsel was not given notice
of the intermediate appellate court's refusal to grant a rehearing
for several days, the delay for applying for a writ of review was
held to run from the date the rehearing was refused.
48. Succession of Babin, 213 La. 950, 35 So. (2d) 864 (1948).
49. Succession of Addison, 212 La. 846, 33 So. (2d) 658 (1947)..

50. La. Const. of 1921, Art, VII, § 27.
51. 212 La. 325, 31 So.

(2d) 815 (1947).

52. 213 La. 644, 35 So. (2d) 416 (1948). See, also to the same effect,
Thomas v. Maryland Casualty Co., 213 La. 650, 35 So. (2d) 418 (1948). These
cases overruled Morning Star Baptist Church v. Martina, 150 La. 951, 91
So. 404 (1922), and approved the cases to the contrary.
53. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 24.
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The general rule that a litigant must exhaust all of his remedies in the court below before invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of the supreme court was applied once during the past
54

term.

Supervisory writs were recalled in two cases because changed
circumstances presented only moot questions. In one, 55 alternative writs issued to review the trial court's order to plaintiff to
submit to a physical examination and to produce certain evidence was recalled after the trial court had vacated the order
complained of on motion of defendant. In the other, 56 alternative writs issued to inquire into the validity of the trial judge's
refusal to sign a judgment were recalled when the judgment in
question was signed. But in a third case,57 even though the court
found that the case now presented only a moot question, the
recall of the writ was refused. A decision of a court of appeal
affirming the judgment appealed from and ordering the abatement of a nuisance sought to be reviewed under a writ of review
was acknowledged to be moot when the nuisance burned pending
review and defendant had no intention of rebuilding it. However, the writ was not recalled but the case was remanded to
the trial court with instructions to dismiss it as a moot case.
5
Supervisory writs were employed successfully in one case 8
to coerce the trial judge into granting a husband a suspensive
appeal from a judgment ordering him to pay alimony to his
wife pendente lite.
Exemptions from Seizure
J. B. Beaird Company v. Aubrey"9 presented a simple but
interesting question of whether defendant's home was exempt
from seizure, or whether its seizure would be allowed as an
exception to the constitutional prohibition60 on the ground that
the debt sought to be enforced was a liability "incurred by any
fiduciary for money collected or received on deposits." The
defendant was an assistant purchasing agent of plaintiff, and
through fictitious orders for materials placed with a third party
was able to defraud the plaintiff of a considerable amount of
money, for which judgment was rendered in the court below.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

McGehee v. Town of Kentwood, 213 La. 721, 35 So. (2d) 589 (1948).
Brown v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 212 La. 700, 33 So. (2d) 200 (1947).
Tucker v. Edwards, 212 La. 457, 32 So. (2d) 845 (1947).
Caddo Parish School Board v. Pyle, 212 La. 481, 32 So. (2d).897 (1947).
Foret v. Gautreaux, 36 So. (2d) 393 (La. 1948).
J. B. Beaird Co. v. Aubrey, 213 La. 509, 35 So. (2d) 129 (1948).
La. Const. of 1921, Art. XI, §§ 1 and 2.
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As the defendant did not sign the plaintiff's checks, did not
handle, or have authority to handle, any of the plaintiff's money
and property, the court held the funds were not obtained while
defendant was acting in a fiduciary capacity. The judgment of
the trial court, holding defendant's home exempt from seizure,
was affirmed.
Injunction
In the cases 61 dealing with injunction procedure, the points
presented were clear-cut and settled through application of rudimentary principles. In these cases, consolidated for trial and
appeal, plaintiff and defendant had filed separate suits against
each other and other parties, each asserting the ownership of
certain timber, and each seeking injunctive relief to prevent the
other from cutting and removing the timber. On proper showings, temporary restraining orders and rules to show cause why
preliminary injunctions should not issue were granted in both
cases. After the trial of the rules nisi, the trial court rendered
judgments on the merits, though the record showed that the
cases were submitted only on the issue of whether preliminary
injunctions should be granted or not. Under the circumstances,
the supreme court properly remanded the cases to the court
below for further proceedings not inconsistent with the appellate
court's vacation of the judgments on the merits.
ExtraordinaryWrits
The writ of habeas corpus again was employed success62
fully by a mother to regain the custody of her minor child.
Under the facts found established by the record, the relatrix had
left the matrimonial domicile because of the alleged cruelty of
her husband, and no basis for any attack upon the moral character of the mother or her fitness to rear the child was found.
Under these circumstances, the custody of the child was given'
to the mother pending the outcome of a separation suit between
the parents.
The court again had occasion to apply the rule that the extraordinary writ of mandamus lies only to compel the performance
of a ministerial duty. 3 The judgment of the court below order1

61. Kirby Lumber Corporation v. Cain; Anderson-Post Hardwood Lbr.
Co. v. Kirby Lumber Corporation, 212 La. 1055, 34 So. (2d) 259 (1948).
62. State ex rel. Morrison v. Morrison, 212 La. 463, 32 So. (2d) 259 (1948).

63. Houeye v. St. Helena Parish School Board, 213 La. 807, 35 So. (2d) 739
(1948).
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ing the reinstatement of a teacher dismissed by a school board
after hearing was set aside. As the statute under which the
defendant board proceeded provided for a judicial review and as,
there was no ministerial duty on the part of the board to reemploy the teacher, it was held that mandamus would not lie.
Real Actions
One of the essentials of the jactitory action is the possession
of the plaintiff, and the type of possession required varies with
the character of the land in dispute. In one case, 64 both the trial
and appellate court found that the alleged possession of plaintiff
was not sufficient to maintain the petitory action. A judgment
dismissing the suit was affirmed.
Miscellaneos
In Washington v. Palmer,65 plaintiff obtained a judgment
against defendant husband at a time while the latter was living
with his wife. Subsequently defendant and his wife were divorced. A suit to revive the judgment thereafter was brought
against the husband alone. The latter's objections that the action
to revive should be brought against the wife as well was swept
aside by the court. The well-recognized rules that the husband
is always bound unconditionally on all community obligations
and that he may be sued alone therefor after the dissolution of
the community were applied.
An interesting point of interdiction procedure was reviewed.
and applied in Interdiction of Maestri." Contending that the
annual account filed by the interdict's curator contained overcharges in an item for the board and lodging of the interdict,
and attorney's fees charged the curator, two nieces and a nephew
of the interdict opposed the account. In the court below all of
these oppositions were dismissed. On appeal, the decision of
the trial court was affirmed, the court holding that the opponents
had no interest in opposing the account, as they did not claim
to be creditors or otherwise interested in the estate. As in the
case of tutorship, the court pointed out that the annual account
rendered by the curator is not binding upon the incapacitated
party, and any injury sustained by the latter might be asserted
64. Jeanerette Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Kemper, 213 La. 785, 35 So. (2d)

732 (1948).
65. 213 La. 79, 34 So. (2d) 382 (1948).
66. 213 La. 213, 34 So. (2d) 790 (1948).

1949]

WORK OF THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT

247

against the representative by an opposition against the latter's
account.
VII. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Dale E. Bennett*
A.

CRIMINAL LAW

Definition of Crimes-Degree of Certainty Required
A number of recent decisions have served to crystallize and
clarify the supreme court's position as to the certainty with
which a criminal statute must define the proscribed criminal
conduct. In State v. Truby' the supreme court previously held
that the definition of keeping a disorderly house, as the keeping
of a house to be used habitually for any "immoral purpose," was
unconstitutional on the grounds of uncertainty. The court had
stressed the idea that the phrase "immoral purpose" was a concept of such diverse connotations that its judicial interpretation
would vary with the standards of morality of each community
and of each individual judge. Such a nebulous standard failed
to apprise sufficiently the individual of the line between proper
and criminal conduct. Following this same line of reasoning the
supreme court held in State v. Vallery2 that Clause 7 of Article
92 of the Criminal Code, which defined contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile as enticing, aiding or permitting a juvenile
to "perform any immoral act," was unconstitutional by reason of
its vagueness, indefiniteness and uncertainty. Again the supreme
court announced the general principle that a criminal statute
must define the act denounced "with such precision [that] the
person sought to be held accountable will know his conduct is
such that it falls within the purview of the act intended to be
'3
prohibited.
Compare, however, the supreme court's holding in State v.
Saibold4 that Article 81 of the Criminal Code, which defined the
crime of indecent behavior with juveniles as the commission of
"any lewd or lascivious act upon the person or in the presence
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 211 La. 178, 29 So. (2d) 758 (1947), discussed by author (1948) 8 LouISIANA LAW REviEw 283.
2. 212 La. 1095, 34 So. (2d) 329 (1948).
3. 34 So. (2d) 329, 331.
4. 213 La. 415, 34 So. (2d) 909 (1948).

